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I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a world in which authors were denied ownership of their 
creative work after investing their time and energy, with the credit 
instead being given to their editor or publisher.  It would be 
unconscionable.  Similarly, imagine a world in which songwriters did 
not own the songs they wrote, but instead the copyright went to the 
sound mixer.  The results seem unpalatable—because they go against 
human intuition and are supposed to be legally prohibited through the 
protection of copyright law.  Nonetheless, a version of the previous 
scenario is what happened to the film director in 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. 
Merkin.1  After creating the film “Heads Up,” the Second Circuit 
denied the film director any copyright interest or protection.2  This 
comment analyzes the legal implications of the holding in the case 16 
Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, which was one of first impression for the 
Second Circuit. 
Part II sets forth the history and expansion of the copyright statute.  
Part III provides the facts from the case of 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. 
Merkin.  Part IV addresses the standard of joint authorship.  Part V then 
examines why a director’s contribution to a film is a work of authorship 
because it is a writing that is original to the author, that is fixed in a 
tangible medium.  Part VI suggests that the Second Circuit decision 
was influenced by unfounded fears due to the work made for hire 
doctrine. Finally, Part VII concludes with a plain reading of the 
copyright statute and application to the case at hand. 
II. THE REQUIREMENTS OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION AND 
ITS CONTINUED EXPANSION 
Since copyright law began in America, it has sought to protect 
creative works while also fostering creativity and progress.  As the law 
developed, it furthered these aims by being expansive and continuously 
widening its breadth of coverage.  The first copyright law enacted in 
1790 was an exercise of Congress’s constitutional power, “[t]o promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing the limited Times 
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”3  The Copyright Act provides creators 
protection by giving them certain exclusive rights such as the right; 
                                                                                                             
 1 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 254 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 2 Id. 
 3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl 8. 
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(1) to reproduce, (2) to create derivative works, (3) to distribute copies 
to the public by sale or other means, (4) to perform publicly, and (5) to 
display publicly.4  Copyright protection has expanded to include 
protection for new technologies, industries and business relationships 
through new enactments and revisions by Congress5 along with 
Supreme Court interpretations.6  As a result, the types of works that are 
entitled to protection has grown and expanded. 
A work must meet two fundamental criteria to benefit from the 
statute’s protection; it must be an original work of authorship and be 
fixed in a tangible medium.7  Beyond these two threshold requirements, 
the Act maintains wide coverage by requiring only minimal levels of 
creativity, or aesthetic merit, rather than applying a heightened 
standard.8  Therefore, the prerequisites to receive protection do not 
prevent room for broad coverage or the possibility to expand over time 
as technology and creativity continue to grow. 
The first requirement that a work must meet to be under the 
purview of the copyright statute is that it is an original work of 
authorship.9  The Act does not set forth a specific definition for an 
original work of authorship and includes a non-exhaustive list that 
courts interpret broadly.10  In fact, there has been a great expansion in 
the definition of a work of authorship since the adoption of copyright 
protection in America.  At the time of adoption, the first copyright 
statute only gave protection to, “map[s], chart[s,] . . . or books.”11  It 
was not until later enactments that works such as music and drama 
became included in the Act even though these forms of expression were 
clearly present well before their authorship was recognized.  Through 
each enactment, the Act has become broader in coverage—from the 
original list of protected works.12  The statute currently includes: (1) 
                                                                                                             
 4 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2015). 
 5 H.R. REP. 94-1476 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659. 
 6 In Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884), the Supreme Court 
recognized that photographers receive copyright protection in their photographs.  
Copyright was created as a matter of law in the photo because of the choices and 
arrangement selections made, even though photographs were not listed in the statute. 
Photographs were not listed because photography as an art was then unknown, due to the 
fact that the science and chemistry behind it was not in existence. Then, in Bleistein v. 
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903), the Supreme Court gave copyright 
protection to circus advertisements, stating that commercial use did not remove an 
illustration from the fine arts category. 
 7 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2015). 
 8 H.R. REP. 94-1476, at 51 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664. 
 9 § 102. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 660 (1834). 
 12 Id. 
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literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; 
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) 
pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and 
sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) 
sound recordings; and (8) architectural works.13  The Act is even 
broader than a facial reading may suggest since the Act’s use of the 
word “include” makes clear that the listing is illustrative and not 
limitative, meaning that although eight works are explicit in the statute, 
other works not listed are also eligible as works of authorship.14  Since 
its inception, the Act’s coverage has been continuously expanding the 
meaning of what constitutes a work of authorship.  In light of both 
Congress’s and the courts’ interpretation of the Act, expansion of what 
forms of expression receive protection should continue as new ways of 
expression are constantly being created and have much faster 
publication abilities. 
The second requirement for a work to be copyrighted is that it 
must be fixed in a tangible medium.15  This prerequisite is also 
interpreted broadly; a work can be “fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression, now known or later developed.”16  This language suggests 
that the requirement that a work is “fixed” is an opened-ended category, 
which can be satisfied by many options including those that do not 
currently exist.17  As the statute itself states; “Under the bill it makes 
no difference what the form, manner, or medium of fixation may 
be . . . whether embodied in a physical object in written, printed, 
photographic, sculptural, punched, magnetic, or any other stable form;” 
as long as it is fixed, it is eligible for statutory protection.18 
After a work qualifies for protection under the Copyright Act, 
there are still other factors that need to be examined for a creator to 
understand her rights completely under the Act.  Other factors include 
how the work was created, who created it, and any contractual 
obligations, all of which will affect the author’s rights.  A work could 
be a solo work, a joint work with another author, or an independent 
work included in a collective work.  The classification of the work 
affects the rights and copyright claims a creator can make if there are 
multiple authors. 
                                                                                                             
 13 § 102. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2015).  See H.R. REP. 94-1476, at 52 (1976), reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5665 (explaining the broad application of this requirement). 
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Sometimes even though a creative work is a work of authorship 
fixed in a tangible medium, the copyright protection does not vest with 
the author.  Copyright might vest with someone other than the author 
when a work was created according to the “work made for hire” 
doctrine. The statute sets out two ways for a work to be considered a 
work made for hire: (1) the work is prepared by an employee within the 
scope of his or her employment, or (2) a work is specially ordered or 
commissioned.19  If an employee prepares a work within the scope of 
employment, the copyright vests with the employer automatically; 
however, if it is a commissioned work then there must be a written 
document that expressly states the parties’ agreement that the work 
shall be considered a work made for hire.20  Without such a written 
agreement, the owner of the work commissioned does not receive the 
copyright for the work created, but rather the author of the work 
receives the copyright.21 
All these considerations came into play when the Second Circuit 
addressed a question of first impression in 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. 
Merkin.22 The court in that instance asked, “[m]ay a contributor to a 
creative work whose contributions are inseparable from, and integrated 
into, the work maintain a copyright interest in his or her contributions 
alone?”23  The statute has multiple elements that a court must examine 
before deciding whether or not a creative work falls under the purview 
of the copyright statute.  However, this comment contends that if a 
work meets all the required elements, and is neither a joint work nor a 
work made for hire, a court should not deny protection because of 
unfounded fears that copyright would become “Swiss cheese” with too 
many potential interests, when the statute has a history of being 
welcoming towards expansion.24 
III. CASE OF FIRST IMPRESSION FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT: 
16 CASA DUSE, LLC V. MERKIN 
On June 29th, 2015, the Second Circuit was faced with the 
challenge of deciding whether or not to expand protection of the 
Copyright Act to a director’s contribution to a film.  The only 
                                                                                                             
 19 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2015). 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 254 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. at 258. 
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analogous case is Garcia v. Google, Inc., decided in the Ninth Circuit.25  
In that case, the court addressed whether an actress has “an 
independently copyrightable contribution” to a motion picture.26  In the 
Ninth Circuit, the panel hearing the case answered in the affirmative 
stating that the actress, Garcia, had established a copyright interest in 
the film “Innocence of Muslims.”27  However, the decision was 
reversed en banc.28 
The Second Circuit case centered around Alex Merkin (“Merkin”) 
a film director who relied on the Copyright Act to protect his creative 
work of directing a motion picture.  The creative aspects of his work 
included, “advising and instructing the film’s cast and crew on matters 
ranging from camera angles and lighting to wardrobe and makeup to 
the actors’ dialogue and movement.”29  This creative work was fixed in 
the film “Heads Up” produced by film production company 16 Casa 
Duse, LLC (“Casa Duse”) who also looked to the Copyright Act to 
protect their contribution in the film.30  However, the Second Circuit 
held that only Casa Duse’s contribution to the film constituted a 
copyrightable work.31  This decision ripped away any protection and 
interest Merkin had and left him without any protection or claim to his 
creative work.32  This result ignores the purpose of the Copyright Act 
to encourage creation and is based on unfounded fears. The court 
worried that giving directors, like Merkin, a copyright interest in their 
contributions, in an already recognized work of authorship would 
“make Swiss cheese of copyrights,” by having too many interests in 
one work.33 
Robert Krakovski (“Krakovski”) owns and operates Casa Duse 
and in September 2010 he purchased the rights to the screenplay for 
“Heads Up” and soon after asked Merkin to direct the film.34  Although 
other members of the film signed work for hire  agreements that stated 
that Casa Duse would be the recipient of all the rights in the film 
                                                                                                             
 25 Garcia v. Google, Inc., 743 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir. 2014), overruled by Garcia v. 
Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 26 Id. at 1262–63. 
 27 Id. at 1268–69. 
 28 An en banc panel of the 9th Circuit reversed its previous holding that a performance 
that exhibited at least a “minimal degree of creativity” engaged in an original act of 
authorship, for fear that such a holding would result in “[a] legal morass[,] . . . [making] 
Swiss cheese of copyrights.” Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 742 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 29 Casa Duse, 791 F.3d at 251. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. at 259. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Garcia, 786 F.3d at 742. 
 34 Casa Duse, 791 F.3d at 251. 
2016] Cheddar, Not Swiss 137 
including copyright, Merkin never signed such an agreement.35  
Krakovski had sent Merkin numerous requests to sign a “Director 
Employment Agreement” that required Merkin to sign away his rights 
in the films, but Merkin ultimately never signed one.36  Despite failing 
to receive a proper work for hire agreement, Krakovski allowed Merkin 
to perform his role as director.37  After Merkin had completed his work 
on the film and contributed his creative work, both parties attempted to 
negotiate an agreement.38  Throughout the process, Merkin maintained 
that he was “not giving up any creative or artistic rights he had in the 
project and all of [his] creative work . . . is still [his] work and not the 
property of 16 Casa Duse, LLC.”39 
Negotiations ultimately collapsed between the parties as Casa 
Duse did not want “Heads Up” to be a joint venture, and Merkin did 
not want to give up any of his rights.40  In January 2012, without Casa 
Duse’s permission, Merkin asserted himself as the sole author.41  He 
registered a copyright in the film as a motion picture with the United 
States Copyright Office and entitled the project “Raw Footage in the 
film ‘Heads Up.’”42  Then in March 2012, as part of Krakovski’s plan 
to publicize the film, he started submitting “Heads Up” to various film 
festivals.43  He scheduled a screening for seventy people at the New 
York Film Academy (NYFA) with a reception at a restaurant afterward, 
which cost him $1,956.58.44  In response, Merkin threatened to send a 
cease and desist order to the NYFA.  The order led to the cancellation 
of the screening, the loss of Casa Duse’s restaurant deposit, and failure 
to secure any other film festival screenings.45 
In the aftermath, Casa Duse filed suit against Merkin seeking a 
temporary restraining order and injunction enjoining Merkin from 
interfering with Casa Duse’s use of “Heads Up.”46  The district court 
ultimately granted the restraining order and injunction.47  
Subsequently, Casa Duse filed an amended complaint requesting a 
judgment that declared that Casa Duse was not liable to Merkin for 
                                                                                                             
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 252 
 39 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 40 Casa Duse, 791 F.3d at 252. 
 41 Id. at 252–53. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 253. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Casa Duse, 791 F.3d. at 253. 
 47 Id. 
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copyright infringement, Merkin did not own copyright interest in the 
film, and also requested that Merkin withdraw his copyright 
registration.48  In response, Merkin filed an Amended Answer that 
included counterclaims that requested a judgment declaring that a 
motion picture director is an author, that the copyright statute has no 
provision for a merged work, that there could be no work for hire 
without an express writing, and finally that Merkin’s copyright 
registration was valid.49  Ultimately the district court found that Merkin 
could not copyright his creative contributions.50  This comment 
contends that both decisions denied an author who created an original 
work of authorship that was fixed in a tangible medium of express 
copyright protection. 
IV. SINCE NEITHER MERKIN NOR KRAKOVSKI INTENDED 
THEIR WORKS TO MERGE INTO ONE THEY ARE NOT JOINT 
AUTHORS 
Not all creative works are going to have one author.  Often, people 
will work collaboratively to create a new piece of work.  Examples 
include co-authored novels and famous songwriting teams such as 
Robert Lopez and Kristen Anderson-Lopez, who wrote the award-
winning song “Let It Go” for the film Frozen.51  The Copyright Act has 
provided for this occurrence with its inclusion of the joint work 
provision.  Under the Act, a joint work is defined as “a work prepared 
by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be 
merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”52  
The joint authorship provision gives each author an equal and 
undivided interest in the whole work.53  Each joint author then receives 
the right to use or to license the work as they desire but he or she must 
provide the other joint author with any profits made from the use of 
that work.54 
However, not all works that have multiple authors are recognized 
as works of joint authorship.  To determine whether or not a work 
qualifies as a joint work, the Second Circuit uses a standard developed 
in Childress v. Taylor.55  In that case, an actress claimed that her 
                                                                                                             
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 255. 
 51 Robert Lopez Biography, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0520188/
?ref_=nm_ov_bio_lk1 (last visited Jan. 23, 2016). 
 52 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2015). 
 53 Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 199 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 54 Id. 
 55 Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1991). 
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contributions that were limited to providing research material to a play 
entitled her to joint authorship and shared rights to the play.56  The 
elements of the test are that: (1) the contribution of each joint author 
must be copyrightable and (2) that the parties must have intended to be 
joint authors.57  These requirements help protect authors from being 
denied exclusive authorship status because another person provided 
some form of assistance and minimal contribution that did not have any 
substantive bearing on the work.58  It also provides safeguards to ensure 
that when equal rights are at stake, they are only reserved for 
relationships in which the participants fully intend to share those rights 
and do not end up forcing two unwilling partners to share ownership 
and rights on one piece of property.59 
Although the Childress test seems to be straightforward, a 
problem arises when both authors have collaborated in some sense, but 
dispute whether or not there was a mutual intent to create a joint work.60  
However, based on the language of the statute which requires “with the 
intention that their contributions be merged,”61 there must be some 
level of intent so that mere collaboration alone is not enough.62  The 
court in Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc. pointed out that requiring 
collaboration alone would affect the quality of work created as “[t]hose 
seeking copyrights would not seek further refinement that colleagues 
may offer if they risked losing their sole authorship.”63 This risk would 
mean that creators would not seek out criticism or help in making their 
work better for fear of having to share ownership, which would be 
harmful to the world of creation.64 
In the creation of “Heads Up,” Krakovski and Merkin 
automatically fail the second factor of the Childress test because 
neither party had the intent to merge their contributions.65  Their lack 
of intent is evident by the failed negotiations between the two parties 
which stemmed from Krakovski’s efforts to get Merkin to sign a work 
for hire agreement and Merkin’s refusal sign away his rights.66  
Although Merkin’s contribution to the motion picture fails the 
                                                                                                             
 56 Id. 
 57 See Id. at 507; Thomson, 147 F.3d at 199; Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 
1061, 1068–69 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 58 See Thomson, 147 F.3d at 200; Childress, 945 F.2d at 509. 
 59 Childress, 945 F.2d at 509. 
 60 Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1068. 
 61 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2015). 
 62 Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1068. 
 63 Id. at 1069. 
 64 Id. 
 65 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 255 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 66 Id. at 252. 
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Childress test and statutory requirement of intent, there are cases “in 
which the parties share a pre-concerted intent that their works be 
merged to form a unitary whole yet still do not contemplate that the 
result of their labors will be a work of joint authorship.”67  That 
describes the situation here, where both parties, Casa Duse, and 
Merkin, were aware of the fact that the final product of their creative 
efforts would be a single motion picture, yet did not intend for their 
rights to become merged as joint authors. 
In an extremely analogous case, the Second Circuit was asked to 
determine whether a dramaturge’s68 contributions to a play, that were 
more than de minimis, qualified the dramaturge as an author of the 
copyrightable material.69  In Thomson v. Larson, the dramaturge 
worked extensively on the script of the musical “Rent” with the original 
and well-known author Jonathan Larson.70  The product of their work 
together was a new version of the script that was “characterized by 
experts as a radical transformation of the show.”71  The court rejected 
the premise that Thomson, the dramaturge, was a joint author because 
of lack of intent evidenced by Larson’s sole decision-making authority 
and billing.72  However, Thomson then went on to claim that in regard 
to copyrightable material, a co-created work should be separated into 
its components and that she had a copyright claim in her component.73 
The dramaturge’s claims raised the question of, “whether a person 
who makes a non-de minimis copyrightable contribution but cannot 
meet the mutual intent requirement of co-authorship, retains, in the 
absence of a work-for-hire agreement or of any explicit contractual 
assignment of the copyright, any rights and interests in his or her own 
contribution.”74  The Second Circuit was able to avoid answering that 
question on procedural grounds since Thomson did not raise the 
exclusive right argument until her appeal, thus leaving the question 
open until now.75 
By denying Merkin a copyright interest in his creative 
contribution to “Heads Up,” the Second Circuit finally answered this 
question.  However, this comment contends that the court erred in this 
                                                                                                             
 67 1-6 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 6.07[B] (2012). 
 68 Dramaturge, OXFORD ONLINE DICTIONARY, (Nov. 2015), http://www.oxford
dictionaries.com. 
 69 Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 70 Id. at 197. 
 71 Id. at 198 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 72 Id. at 205. 
 73 Id. at 206. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Thomson, 147 F.3d at 206. 
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decision.  Even though Merkin and Casa Duse do not meet the precise 
intent elements of a joint work, Merkin should not be denied his 
copyright rights since “nothing in the Copyright Act suggests that a 
copyright interest in a creative contribution to a work simply disappears 
because the contributor doesn’t qualify as a joint author of the entire 
work.”76 
The Second Circuit relied on only two lines of reasoning to make 
its decision.  Its first reason focuses on the word “inseparable” in the 
definition of joint work in the Act.  The court stated that the use of the 
word “inseparable” in the definition suggests that since the 
contributions themselves cannot be separated, they are not considered 
works of authorship.77  The basis for this argument comes from another 
term defined in the Act, which is a “collective work.”  A “collective 
work” is one in which a number of contributions, constituting separate 
and independent works in themselves are assembled into a collective 
whole.78  The court reasoned that since a “collective work” requires 
each contribution to be separate and independent “in order to obtain 
their own copyright protection also indicates that inseparable 
contributions integrated into a single work cannot separately obtain 
such protection.”79  In order to support this conclusion, the court relied 
on a House Report on the 1976 Copyright Act, which stated that motion 
pictures are usually a joint work.80  However, the court did not mention 
that the same report also said that the question of copyrights in 
contributions in films does not typically arise because of the Work 
Made For Hire Doctrine.81 
The reasoning of the court is flawed because it ignores the Work 
Made For Hire Doctrine, and also assumes that inseparable 
contributions are not independently copyrightable based on their 
entwined nature.  Even though at the time the House Report was written 
it stated that separate copyrights do not exist in a film unless the motion 
picture incorporates separate, freestanding pieces that independently 
constitute “works of authorship,” significant time has passed since 
1976.82  Since then, copyright protection has expanded in a variety of 
areas due to the expansion of creativity and technology.  Such 
                                                                                                             
 76 Garcia v. Google, Inc., 743 F.3d 1258, 1263 (9th Cir. 2014), overruled by Garcia v. 
Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 77 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 257 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 78 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2015). 
 79 Casa Duse, 791 F.3d at 257. 
 80 H.R. REP. 94-1476, at 120 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736 
(emphasis added). 
 81 Id. 
 82 H.R. REP. 94-1476, at 122 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5737. 
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protection is bound to keep expanding further with the never-ending 
growth of today’s technology and the use of the internet.83  The law 
should continue to keep up with society’s culture and technology.  
Expansion in protection is in line with the history and tradition of the 
Act.  Additionally, if a work qualifies as a work of authorship, there 
should be no restriction on its protection just because it is intertwined 
with another work of authorship. 
V. A DIRECTOR’S CONTRIBUTION TO A FILM IS A WORK OF 
AUTHORSHIP 
Since the purpose of copyright, as stated in the Constitution, is to 
promote the progress of the useful arts,84 the Supreme Court has set a 
very low bar of creativity and originality for a work to receive 
protection and thus promote the arts.85  The Copyright Act itself does 
not include a definition of a work of authorship; however, the Supreme 
Court has provided guidance by holding that “to qualify for copyright 
protection, a work must be original to the author”86 and that “copyright 
protects only those constituent elements of a work that possess more 
than a de minimis quantum of creativity.87  Even though there needs to 
be more than a de minimis level of creativity, the Act does not require 
novelty but only a “minimal creative spark.”88  Merkin’s contribution 
to the film met the minimal requirement of creativity since it involved 
innovative thought and influence. 
A. By Giving Meaning to the Work as a Whole, Merkin’s More than 
De Minimis Contribution to “Heads Up” is Copyrightable 
In a Supreme Court case, Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. 
Co., a telephone service used a rival company’s telephone book without 
permission to retrieve phone numbers to use in its telephone 
directory.89  The telephone service was then sued for copyright 
                                                                                                             
 83 In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005) 
a new sub-species of copyright infringement was created in response to the expansion of 
the internet that renders a defendant liable for copyright infringement if he has 
“distribute[d] a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown 
by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement.” 
 84 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl 8. 
 85 See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879); Feist Publ’ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. 
Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
 86 Feist Publ’ns Inc., 499 U.S. at 345. 
 87 Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 363; Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1067–72 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(holding that an actor’s suggestions to a script were de minimis and thus there was not joint 
ownership). 
 88 Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 363. 
 89 Id. at 344. 
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infringement by its competitor.90   The Supreme Court acknowledged 
that even though originality is not a stringent requirement, the copying 
of facts did not have “the modicum of creativity necessary to transform 
mere selection into copyrightable expression”91 and that “copyright 
rewards originality.”92  Even though the Court stated that only an iota 
of originality is required to be covered by the Copyright Act, the 
copying of facts does not even meet that extremely low bar.93 
Since “the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; [and] 
even a slight amount will suffice,” a director’s contribution to a film 
passes the extremely low bar of creativity required to be covered by the 
statute.94  Merkin’s contribution as an director included advising and 
instructing the film’s cast and crew on the following decisions: what 
camera angles to use; what lighting best fit the scene; and what the 
character should be wearing, doing and saying.95  It is the job of the 
director to “interpret the script, coach the performers . . . [and] to 
attend  . . . to endless minor nuances and gestures.”96  Each one of these 
elements requires thought and ingenuity on the part of the director.  A 
director creates a particular style and visual for a film that is different 
from any other motion picture and even different from that another 
director might have created.  It is the director’s job to innovate and 
translate the written word or script into specific scenes with particular 
looks, themes and images thereby creating the point of view of the 
film.97  Based on the fact that a compilation of factual material can gain 
copyright protection if the complier’s arrangement is unique, a 
director’s particular take on a script that results in a one of a kind film 
should also gain copyright protection.98 
Both the Second and Ninth Circuit have a history of protecting the 
story-telling tools used in dramatic works.  As early as 1936, the 
Second Circuit acknowledged the significance of movements in a 
dramatic work.99  In Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., the 
Second Circuit held that “a nod, a movement of the hand, or a pause 
become bound together in an inseparable unity that depicts the dramatic 
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meaning and any use of which without permission is copyright 
infringement.”100  Sheldon involved a copyright infringement claim 
stemming from a movie that was based on a true story from Scotland 
involving a controversial murder by a young woman.101  The same story 
had previously been made into a play by the plaintiff who filed suit 
stating that the movie infringed on his copyright.102  In defense to the 
claim, the movie studio said that it only took the play’s unprotected 
elements because the story itself was one of fact and that dialogue came 
from the play.103  However, the court noted that the scenes in the movie 
mimicked scenes and sequences from the play almost exactly.104  The 
court said “[s]peech is only a small part of a dramatist’s means of 
expression” and that “a play may lapse into pantomime at its most 
poignant and significant moments . . . [that] tell the audience more than 
words could tell.”105  If copyright protects the medium of expression 
that an author may use to give his work dramatic meaning, which is 
what a director’s contribution to film does, then his contribution must 
also be copyrightable.  A director’s work on a movie involves creating 
the movement of a film through his direction of the actors as well as 
other decisions that gives the film dramatic significance and the scenes 
meaning, which the Second Circuit has already said is protected 
material.106 
The Ninth Circuit made reached a similar decision.  The court 
stated that even though “[m]ere motions, voice, and postures of actors 
and mere stage business are not subject of copyright protection . . . the 
means of expressing an idea is [protected].”107  In Universal Pictures 
Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., the Harold Lloyd Corporation sued 
Universal Pictures for copyright infringement of its movie “Movie 
Crazy” because fifty-seven scenes including the ‘Magician’s Coat 
Sequence’ were reproduced in Universal’s movie “So’s Your 
Uncle.”108  Universal’s defense was that the sequence depicted only 
comic gags and stage business, which is not copyrightable because it 
does not tell a story.109  Using the same reasoning found in the Second 
Circuit’s decision in Sheldon, the Ninth Circuit held that such elements, 
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when combined to create an original combination that is important to 
establish the storyline with dialogue and action, become 
copyrightable.110  Additionally, the court stated that “[t]he means of 
expressing an idea is subject to copyright protection, and where one 
uses his own method or way of expressing his idea, such adornment 
constitutes a protectable work.”111 
In adopting this line of reasoning used by both the Ninth and 
Second Circuit, it is unmistakable the Merkin’s contribution to the film 
is copyrightable.  The dramatic composition of a movie stems from the 
director’s command of the scene.  The director controls every decision 
from what the actors wear, to where they stand, how they move, and 
what they say.  Those decisions coupled with camera angles, lighting, 
and other significant aspects of the director’s authority affect the story 
and meaning of each scene and are the driving force behind the creation 
of the storyline of the movie overall. 
B. A Director’s Contribution to a Motion Picture is Original to the 
Director 
Through a series of Supreme Court cases, the word “writings” has 
been established to have a broad meaning.112  The Court began to 
interpret this word broadly in the late nineteenth century when two 
significant copyright cases came before the Supreme Court.  They were 
the Trade-Mark Cases,113 and Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. 
Sarony.114  In the Trade-Mark Cases, the Supreme Court had to review 
the constitutionality of the Trademark Act.  Then in Burrow-Giles, the 
Court had to address a copyright infringement claim regarding a photo 
of Oscar Wilde in which the defendant argued that Congress’s 
constitutional right to confer rights of authorship did not extend to the 
creator of a photograph.  With these questions in mind, the Court had 
to define the crucial terms of “authors” and “writings” and in both 
instances, the Court focused on the importance of originality.115 
When Congress tried to regulate trademark rights through the 
Copyright and Patent Clause of the Constitution, the Court had to 
address whether or not a trademark fell within that power.116  Since the 
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Copyright Clause only protects the writings of authors, the Court had 
to determine what should be considered a writing of an author.117  The 
Court held that even though “the word ‘writings’ may be liberally 
construed,” it only does so if they are original and “founded in the 
creative powers of the mind” in other words “the writings which 
are . . . protected are the fruits of intellectual labor.”118 
The originality requirements founded in these two cases remain 
the criteria of copyrightable material today and the very premise of 
copyright law protection.119  In light of this broad interpretation of the 
word “writings,” Merkin’s work on the film “Heads Up” fits into the 
expansive interpretation of the word “writings.”120  By requiring 
merely a “physical rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or 
aesthetic labor,” a director’s creative input in a film is considered a 
writing.  It is the product of the director’s own thoughts and 
interpretations that then get embodied physically in the movie.121  
Nimmer goes on to suggest that the scope of what is considered a 
writing encompasses non-verbal expressions which includes other non-
verbal works than just the photograph held copyrightable in Burrow-
Giles.122 
In Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., the Supreme Court 
held that an illustration on a circus poster was copyrightable which lead 
to the conclusion that the poster was a writing under the statute.123  The 
combination of the court’s decisions in both Bleistein and Burrow-
Giles establishes that graphic, nonverbal representations may constitute 
a writing in the constitutional sense.124  When looking at the definition 
of the term graphic, which means relating to visual art, it becomes clear 
that Supreme Court precedent suggests that a director’s creation 
involved in a motion picture falls within the scope of a writing because 
it is a graphic, nonverbal representation of a creative work.125 
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Later, Burrow-Giles reaffirmed that the words “writings” and 
“authors” require a broad and encompassing reading.126  In regard to 
authors, the Court went on to specify that an author is the one involved 
in “originating, making, producing, as the inventive or master mind, 
[of] the thing which is to be protected.”127  As for writings, the Court 
detailed that Congress had included any “[means] by which the idea of 
the mind of the author are given visible expression.”128  The Court 
reasoned that the lack of photographs being on the protected list 
enacted in 1802 was because photographs probably did not exist at that 
time, but that the Act is broad enough to cover them as long they are 
“representatives of original intellectual conceptions of the author.”129  
In order for a work to be covered by the Act, it must contain the 
elements of “originality, of intellectual production, of thought, and 
conception on the part of the author.”130  Concerning the Oscar Wilde 
photo, since it was made entirely from the photographer’s mind by his 
actions of  “posing . . . Oscar Wilde in front of the camera, selecting 
and arranging the costume, draperies, and other various accessories in 
said photograph” therefore “it was an original work of art, the product 
of . . . intellectual invention” original to the author.131 
It may seem simple enough to apply the originator standard to a 
filmmaker’s contribution, but motion pictures create a unique problem 
when trying to determine to “whom [it] owes its origin” since by 
definition, motion pictures are works expected to contain contributions 
from multiple individuals.132  Further complicating the problem is that 
these contributions merge to create one unitary whole, making it hard 
to determine who is the originator.133 
A similar problem arose in Aalmuhammed v. Lee, when 
Aalmuhammed worked as a consultant for Spike Lee’s film “Malcolm 
X.”134  As a consultant, he reviewed the script, suggested revisions and 
rewrote scenes for accuracy.135  In the credits, Aalmuhammed was 
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listed only as an Islamic Technical Consultant.136  After the film was 
released, however, he brought an action stating that the movie was a 
joint work and that he was a co-author and therefore a legal co-
owner.137  As discussed above, a joint work requires two or more 
authors, and in this instance, the Ninth Circuit had to figure out how to 
determine who is an author when, as in a movie, “the number of 
contributors grows and the work itself becomes less the product of one 
or two individuals who create it.”138  The court applying the Trade-
Mark and Burrow-Giles standard pointed out that the requirement that 
an author is “the originator or the person who causes something to 
come into being,” is difficult in application.139  Although the 
contributions need to be creative, this provides no assistance in 
reducing the possible originators of a motion picture because it is 
seldom that a contribution to a film is not creative.140  The court went 
on to list some of the possibilities that exist when determining who the 
author of a movie is, with one of those possibilities being the 
director.141  The court stated that: 
For a movie, [an author] might be the producer who raises 
the money. Eisenstein thought the author of a movie was the 
editor. The “auteur” theory suggests that it might be the 
director, at least if the director is able to impose his artistic 
judgments on the film. Traditionally, by analogy to books, 
the author was regarded as the person who writes the 
screenplay, but often a movie reflects the work of many 
screenwriters. Grenier suggests that the person with creative 
control tends to be the person in whose name the money is 
raised, perhaps a star, perhaps the director, perhaps the 
producer, with control gravitating to the star as the financial 
investment in scenes already shot grows. Where the visual 
aspect of the movie is especially important, the chief 
cinematographer might be regarded as the author. And for, 
say, a Disney animated movie like “The Jungle Book,” it 
might perhaps be the animators and the composers of the 
music.142 
As in Casa Duse, the situation between Aalmuhammed and Lee 
was further complicated because there was no contract between the 
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parties.  Therefore, the court had to examine the circumstances of the 
film based on the standards laid out in Burrow-Giles.  The court pointed 
out that the author would be the one that would exercise control and 
likely be the person “who has actually formed the picture by putting 
the persons in position, and arranging the place where the people are to 
be - the man who is the effective cause of that, or . . . gives effect to the 
idea[s].”143  By using this reasoning, the court determined that 
Aalmuhammed did not have any authority in the film and that the 
oversight of its creation remained with Spike Lee, the director, and 
Warner Brothers, the production company.144  Spike Lee was not bound 
to accept any of the recommendations that Aalmuhammed made and, 
therefore, it cannot be said that the film owed its origin to him.145 
Unlike Aalmuhammed, whose only capacity in the making of the 
movie “Malcolm X” was to make suggestions in order to make the 
movie more accurate, Merkin’s role for “Heads Up” was more similar 
to that of an author as defined in the Trade-mark Cases and Burrow-
Giles.  As the director, Merkin is the originator of many aspects of the 
movie, and it is impossible to know what the film would be without his 
contributions.  Whereas Aalmuhammed’s suggestions could be 
disregarded by director Spike Lee as the director himself, Merkin did 
not make suggestions, rather he made decisions that created the film.  
Merkin controlled and made decisions about everything from camera 
angles and lighting, to wardrobe and makeup, including the actors’ 
dialogue and movement.146  The way those elements appear in the 
movies did not exist before him and were within his sole discretion and 
authority.  Using the same House Report relied on by the Second 
Circuit to deny Merkin protection, the House stated that a director of a 
football game was an author by using multiple cameras and deciding 
which ones were sent out to the public.147  This shows that what a 
director adds, even in an uncreative setting, such as a football game 
where the outcome is left up to the players and not the director, is a 
work of authorship.  Therefore, it must lead to the same result where 
the director is contributing even more in a creative setting, such as a 
motion picture.  In the Ninth Circuit’s list of possible motion picture 
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authors, a director was mentioned as a possible author, if the director 
can impose his artistic judgments on the film.148  Merkin was able to 
impose his artistic judgments based on his assigned duties and the work 
he put into the film.149  Importantly, the court did not consider Spike 
Lee as an author because of the “work-for-hire” agreement that he 
signed, assigning his right to Warner Brothers, an agreement that Casa 
Duse was aware Merkin never signed when production began.150 
C. A Director’s Contribution to a Film is Fixed in a Tangible 
Medium of Expression 
While some courts have offered a broad interpretation of the terms 
“writings” and “authors,” courts have also broadly construed the 
requirement that the work be fixed in a tangible medium of expression.  
This broad reading comes straight from the plain language of the statute 
that states that the medium “may be one ‘now known or later 
developed.’”151  This prevents courts from picking and choosing which 
mediums deserve copyright protection more than others.152  The statute 
places great emphasis on fixation so that works that remain unrecorded 
do not receive the same statutory protection as those works that become 
permanent receive.153  Under the statute, a work is fixed if there is an 
authorized embodiment that is permanent or stable.154  The 
performance of a play, or other work, is not considered a writing 
capable of copyright protection because it is not thoroughly embodied 
permanently.155  If the performance is encased in “written” form, such 
as a motion picture, however, then it becomes capable of copyright 
protection.156 
In Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc.,  a 2008 
case, the Second Circuit addressed whether copyrighted material, 
which was only fixed for a brief period in between buffering before it 
was automatically rewritten, constituted copyright infringement.157  
The court pointed out that for a work to be fixed in a tangible medium, 
it must meet two requirements: “the work must be embodied in a 
medium . . . such that it can be perceived [and] reproduced . . . [and 
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that it is perpetual].”158  Since the buffered information did not meet 
the permanency requirement, it was not fixed.159 
While applying the Second Circuit’s two “fixed” requirements to 
Merkin’s contributions to “Heads Up,” it is clear that it was indeed 
fixed in a tangible medium.160  Although at first, the director’s 
contributions are merely thoughts in the director’s head, once those 
ideas are acted out by the actors, and then filmed, they become fixed in 
the finished project in the medium of motion picture; thus meeting the 
first requirement.  Each time the movie “Heads Up” is played, the 
audience watches Merkin’s ideas, thoughts and overall concept of the 
movie permanently displayed in the motion picture.  Once a film is 
recorded with the director’s instructions, the instructions are embodied 
in a manner that is permanent; hence direction necessarily meets the 
minimal amount of fixation requirement, which makes it fall under the 
purview of the statute as fixed in a tangible medium. 
VI. THE SLIPPERY SLOPE OF FRACTURED COPYRIGHT 
PROTECTION IS UNFOUNDED BECAUSE OF THE WORK 
MADE FOR HIRE DOCTRINE 
The Ninth and Second Circuits have expressed concerns that 
extending copyrights to parts of a collaborative work will open the 
floodgates to copyright claims from any person who contributed to the 
work.  This concern, however, is diminished by the Work Made For 
Hire Doctrine.   Casa Duse permitted Merkin to proceed as a director 
of the film without receiving a signed work for hire agreement from 
him; however, Casa Duse tried to have him sign such an agreement, 
which demonstrates that it understood there was a need for Merkin to 
sign one.  If Casa Duse succeeded in getting Merkin’s signature, or 
rather hired another director willing to sign away his or her copyright 
interest, Merkin would have no claim and this case would not exist. 
The commonality between the cases analyzed has been the lack of 
a work for hire agreement between the parties.  The dramaturge in 
Thomson did not have a contract with the playwright, the consultant in 
Aalmuhammed did not have a contract with the director, nor did the 
actress in Garcia have a contract with the director, and finally, Merkin 
did not have an agreement with Casa Duse.161  The reason that all of 
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these creative work relationships resulted in court cases is because they 
lacked the security and clarity of a contract that laid out exactly what 
each parties’ rights were in the creative work that resulted after their 
collaborations. 
Typically, under the Copyright Act, ownership belongs to the 
author or creator of the work that turned the idea into a fixed tangible 
expression.162  An exception to the rule is the Work Made For Hire 
Doctrine as outlined above.  Under this doctrine, the copyright does not 
go to the creator, but rather the person who commissioned the work, if 
there is an express written agreement between the artist and the 
commissioner, or to the creator’s employer.163  The Work For Hire 
Doctrine was examined by the Supreme Court in Community for 
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, where a sculpture was created by an 
artist who was hired by the organization.164  Freelance creators are the 
biggest class affected by this doctrine, which would include the 
directors, dramaturges, actresses and consultants of the cases discussed 
thus far.165  If the parties involved had clear contracts laying out who 
retained the rights and the specifically limited roles each party was to 
play, the courts would not have been involved because there would not 
be much to question. 
In its reversal of Garcia, the Ninth Circuit stated that “Garcia’s 
theory of copyright law [which gave actresses’ copyright interest in the 
contribution to the film] would . . . splinter[] a movie into many 
different ‘works,’ [which would] make[] Swiss cheese of 
copyrights.”166  This quote was then applied by the Second Circuit in 
its decision in Casa Duse.  The Second Circuit based its agreement on 
the fact that: 
Filmmaking is a collaborative process typically involving 
artistic contributions from large numbers of people . . . and 
[if] copyright subsisted separately in each of their 
contributions to the completed film, the copyright in the film 
itself, which is recognized by statute as a work of authorship, 
could be undermined by any number of individual claims.167 
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Although this description is accurate, it neglects the fact that most 
motion pictures are created with work for hire agreements for most of 
the parties involved in their creation.  The court listed producers, 
directors, screenwriters, actors, designers, cinematographers, camera 
operators, and a host of skilled technical contributors as those who 
contribute to the film and would have a copyright claim if the court had 
found for Merkin.168  Despite this type of slippery slope fear that both 
the Ninth and Second Circuits expressed, the only cases that appear 
before the courts are those that lack valid written agreements.  In 
Aalmuhammed, the court commented on the fact that Warner Brothers 
required Spike Lee to sign a work for hire agreement so that even Lee 
would not be a co-author and co-owner with Warner Brothers.169  This 
example illustrates how producers can protect themselves—simply by 
relying upon standard contract law.170 
The dissenting opinion in Garcia’s reversal delineated the flaws 
in the majority opinion in denying the actress her copyright, especially 
in regard to its overlooking the importance of contracts in such areas.171  
Judge Kozinski rightly stated that “[a]ctors usually sign away their 
rights when contracting to do a movie, . . . [and] the absence of a 
contract always complicates things.”172  Without such contracts, the 
parties are left with whatever rights the copyright law gives them, and 
the copyright doctrine should not be subverted by the failure of a 
contractual arrangement.  Without a contract setting forth contrary 
terms, a director whose contribution to a motion picture, which 
qualifies as a work of authorship fixed in a tangible medium, acquires 
a copyright in his interest.173 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The plain language of the Copyright Act states, “[c]opyright 
protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or 
later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine 
or device.”174  Since Merkin’s contribution to the film “Heads Up” was 
an original work of authorship that was fixed in a tangible medium of 
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expression, it follows that he should have had a copyright interest in 
the film.  The Second Circuit, however, denied him of such interest out 
of public policy concerns for allowing creative team members, such as 
actors and directors, a copyright interest in their portions of the film as 
it would open the floodgates to litigation and shake the foundations of 
copyright law.  These concerns are baseless, as most actors, directors, 
set designers, and costume designers sign work for hire agreements, 
which would bar such claims.  Casa Duse was aware that Merkin had 
not signed any work agreement when it let him direct the film, an action 
that should not have occurred if it meant to retain all rights.  The failure 
to do its due diligence should not diminish Merkin’s rights. 
 
